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Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals
Kate Stitht
When he was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1962, Byron Raymond
White was, at the age of 44, a symbol of the vigor, youth, and intellectual
power of the Kennedy administration. From a poor, rural background, he had
ranked first in the class of 1938 at the University of Colorado, becoming a
football All-American and winning a Rhodes Scholarship. By the time he
graduated from Yale Law School in 1946, he had briefly studied at Oxford,
played three seasons of professional football, served as a naval intelligence
officer in the Pacific, and twice encountered John Kennedy (once at Oxford,
once in the Pacific). After clerking for Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, White
joined a law practice in Denver, where he remained for fourteen years. When
Kennedy won the Democratic nomination for President in 1960, White chaired
the nationwide volunteer group Citizens for Kennedy. His service as Deputy
Attorney General under Robert Kennedy included screening candidates for
judicial appointments and supervising federal marshals protecting civil rights
workers in the South. He had been at that job only fourteen months when the
President nominated him to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of
Charles E. Whittaker.
During his thirty-one years on the Court, White's contributions generally
reflected the commitments of the President who appointed him: to equal
opportunity, to effective law enforcement, and to enablement of government
as it responds to new challenges-with less concern for group rights, states'
rights, and claims of special privilege. To the distress of those who would have
preferred greater elaboration of a philosophical vision, he approached the
judicial task in a lawyerly and pragmatic fashion-though sometimes in
curiously cryptic opinions.' His independence and analytic bent of mind often
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School; law clerk to Justice White, October Term 1978. This essay
is drawn largely from a biographical entry that I prepared for the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITTION (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. I 1992), copyright 1992 by MacMillan Publishing
Company; used by permission of the publisher. I gratefully acknowledge the discussions about Justice
White that I have had in recent years with various colleagues, White law clerks, and students. These include
Akhil Amar, Charles G. Cole, Joseph Dole (the first person I heard refer to White as a "New Deal" justice),
Paul Gewirtz, Dennis Hutchinson, Paul Kahn, Lance Liebman, Burke Marshall, Geoffrey Miller, Laura
Miller, Julie Sullivan, and Jonathan Varat.
1. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 45 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., concurring); Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) ('White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
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isolated him from more ideological colleagues. Having served with twenty-one
other Justices during times of great ferment on the Court, his role changed
considerably. He was in the majority in fewer than half of the five-four
decisions during the 1960's, in more than sixty percent of the five-four
decisions during the 1970's, and in nearly three-fourths of five-four decisions
during the 1980's-more frequently than any other Justice during that decade.
(In White's last few terms, Anthony M. Kennedy replaced him as the "swing"
Justice.)2 Although profound changes in American society (often shaped by
the Court itself) significantly affected the issues before him and, to a lesser
extent, his resolution of particular issues, a review of his work on the Court
reveals significant consistency in perspective, method, and conviction.
White always understood that judges make law. His time at Yale Law
School was during the heyday of the school's celebration and elaboration of
legal realism. 3 As he explained in dissent in Miranda v. Arizona:
[T]he Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's
decision ... what it has done is to make new law and new public
policy in much the same way that it has in the course of interpreting
other great clauses of the Constitution .... [Therefore] it is wholly
legitimate . . . to inquire into the advisability of its end product in
terms of the long-range interest of the country.
4
Even when he joined with judicial conservatives in refusing to infer new
constitutional rights, White mocked the idea that the Constitution can or should
be interpreted by reliance on "original intent" or "plain meaning." Thus, even
in dissent in an abortion rights case, he asserted:
The Constitution is not a deed setting forth the precise metes and
bounds of its subject matter; rather, it is a document announcing
fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for
the exercise of normative judgment by those charged with interpreting
and applying it.5
This well sums up White's perspective on not only the proper role of the
courts in constitutional adjudication, but also the proper roles of the other
branches of government in carrying out their constitutional obligations. White
clearly appreciated that the triumph of the administrative state, marked
2. Justice White was in the majority in over 90% of 5-4 cases during October Term 1987. By his final
year on the Court, October Term 1992, this had dropped to just over half of 5-4 cases, whereas Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were each in the majority in approximately
three-fourths of 5-4 cases during that Term. Since he joined the Court, Justice Kennedy has been in the
majority in two-thirds of the 5-4 cases.
3. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).




especially by an affirmative and vigorous federal government, has forever
altered the shape of American political institutions, including the Court.6
For White, however, neither legal realism nor expanding concepts of
national political authority and responsibility justified the exercise of "raw
judicial power."7 A recurring theme of his opinions was that the judiciary
undermines its own legitimacy when it insists upon social or political
objectives not rooted in the Constitution and resisted by the democratic
institutions of society.8 White's confidence in the good faith and capabilities
of democratic institutions--Congress, especially, but also the President, state
legislatures, and juries-exceeded that of other Justices of the "left" or the
"right." For White, the powers of government are limited neither by abstract
conceptions of individual autonomy nor by any extrademocratic mandate for
perfection in human affairs. Rather, government power is limited by the very
forces that legitimate it: the people acting through fair and free elections, and
a Constitution that both authorizes and specifically checks government actors.
In the spirit of the New Deal and of President Kennedy, White gave great
weight to securing and preserving federal authority, especially Congress'
authority. Where Congress had legislated (or federal agencies had acted
pursuant to delegated power), he was disposed to find federal preemption of
state law.9 Where Congress had not legislated, he gave wide berth to the
"dormant" commerce clause.'" Where states sought to regulate federal
entities, he was disposed to place limits on state power. He did not view the
6. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 17-20.
7. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
8. This theme was sounded from White's earliest years on the Court. His first major opinion was a
dissent from the Court's holding, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), that states may not
criminalize narcotics addiction. White objected that despite its "present allergy to substantive due process"
involving "economic regulation," the Court was engaged in a similar endeavor by "writ[ing] into the
Constitution its own abstract notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem." 370 U.S. at 689 (White,
J., dissenting). See also Thomburgh, 476 U.S. at 787 (White, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 337-63 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (white, J.,
dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). In Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), White commanded a majority in proclaiming: "The Court is most vulnerable to and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." 478 U.S. at 194 (White, J.). An almost
identical sentence appears in White's most extensive exposition of his views on the "new" substantive due
process, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). See also infra
notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368 (1990) (White, J.); Edgar v. Mite
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (White, J.); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 749-51 (1981) (White,
J.); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (White, J.); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 165 (1963) (White, J., dissenting). White also generally supported strong enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws, in both private and governmental actions. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 346 (1990) (White, J., joining dissent). See generally James T. Malysiak,
Justice White on Antitrust: Protecting Freedom to Compete, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 497 (1987).
10. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (White,
J.) ("Although the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the
power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.").
il. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
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Tenth Amendment as a limitation on Congress' regulatory power; 2 he
generally permitted Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, 3 and he recognized significant legislative power to
implement the Fourteenth Amendment. 4  Where Congress delegated
interpretative authority to administrative agencies, he deferred to agency
interpretations of statutes.15 In many ways, he was the preeminent nationalist
on the Court in the modem era.
16
White's understanding of the separation of powers in our national
government, as set forth in a series of powerful dissents, was similarly rooted
in a recognition that Congress must have latitude to solve economic problems
and to reallocate governance authorities in response to the growing demands
on federal institutions in the post-New Deal era. So it is that he argued in
dissent in Buckley v. Valeo that "Congress was entitled to determine that
personal wealth ought to play a less important role in political campaigns than
it has in the past."'17 He lamented in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. that "at this point in the history of constitutional law"
the Court should not have "look[ed] only to the constitutional text" to
determine Congress' power "to create adjudicative institutions designed to
carry out federal policy."' 8 He explained in INS v. Chadha that the legislative
veto is an "indispensable political invention that... assures the accountability
of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over
lawmaking."' 9 And in striking down the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
budget-balancing legislation in Bowsher v. Synar because of the Comptroller
General's role in implementing the statute, the Court, "acting in the name of
separation of powers," had crippled "one of the most novel and far-reaching
legislative responses to a national crisis since the New Deal.,
20
12. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2408 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (White, J., joining majority opinion
overruling Usery); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (White, J., joining
dissent); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
13. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) ('White, J.).
14. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (White, J., joining majority).
15. See, e.g., Lechmere v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 850 (1992) (White, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (White, J., joining majority); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (White, J., joining majority); Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (White, J., joining majority); California v. Southland Royalty
Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978) (White, J.).
16. Professor Jonathan D. Varat nicely makes this point at the outset of Justice White and the Breadth
andAllocation of Federal Authority, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 371 (1987): "Justice Byron White is a Federalist.
Not the modem-day, upside-down, anti-Federalist version of a Federalist, but a national Federalist in the
tradition of Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall." Id.
17. 424 U.S. 1, 266 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. 458 U.S. 50, 94 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
19. 462 U.S. 919, 972-73 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
20. 478 U.S. 714,759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). The basis of the Court's decision was a provision
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White conceived of a less dominant role for the federal courts-neither to
supplement nor to supplant congressional policies, but to ensure their fair and
consistent implementation by state and federal actors. Often this approach
meant urging the exercise of federal judicial review.21 He emphatically
dissented in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,22 which held that the President is absolutely
immune from civil damages liability predicated on his official acts, and he was
a leading opponent of Justice Rehnquist's positivist approach to procedural due
process, explaining that "'[piroperty' cannot be defined by the procedures
provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty."2 To achieve
consistency in constitutional interpretation, White took an expansive view of
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state court decisions, 24 and for several
years he conducted an extrajudicial campaign for creation of a national court
of appeals or similar structure to ensure uniformity in federal law.' Most
notably, often dissenting from denial of certiorari, he persistently urged--even
unto his final days on the Court-that the Court use its discretionary
jurisdiction to review apparent inconsistencies in the lower courts.26
in the statute creating the office of the Comptroller General which permitted that officer to be removed by
Act of Congress, and which, in the Court's view, ordained the Comptroller an "agent" of Congress
incapable of executing the law. White aptly characterized the removal provision as a "triviality" that had
"lain dormant" for sixty years and that was of "minimal practical significance" given the "substantial role
played by the President in the process of removal... k' Id. at 759, 765, 771. More generally, he objected
to "the Court's willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar
to the attainment of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the President
in the legislative process established by the Constitution." Id. at 759.
21. Thus, where Congress had not created an administrative remedy, White readily found an implied
cause of action in the relevant constitutional or statutory provisions. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14 (1980) (White, J., joining majority); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (White, J., joining
majority); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (White, J., joining majority). As
he explained in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 789-90 (1982) (White, J., dissenting):
[I]t is not the exclusive prerogative of the Legislative Branch to create a federal cause of action
for a constitutional violation. In the absence of adequate legislatively prescribed remedies, the
general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts permits the courts to create remedies,
both legal and equitable, appropriate to the character of the injury.
22. 457 U.S. 731, 764-97 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
432 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
23. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (White, J.); see also Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (White, J.); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355-61 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (White, J.); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 171-203
(1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (White, J., joining majority); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652 (1979) (White, J.); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(White, J.). See generally Varat, supra note 16, at 388-94.
25. See, e.g., Intercircuit Panel of the United States Act: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 144-47 (1985) (statement of A. Leo
Levin, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, commenting on Justice White's proposals); Supreme Court
Workload: Hearings on H.R. 1968 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 360-61 (1983) (letter from Justice
White to Rep. Kastenmeier); Annual Meeting of American Bar Association, 51 U.S.L.W. 2119 (1982)
(excerpts from speech by Justice White discussing options for streamlining Supreme Court workload).
26. In the 1992 Term alone, Justice White issued 58 dissents from denial of certiorari. See generally
Michael J. Broydle, Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White's
Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 610 (1987).
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On the other hand, White declined to enlarge the role of the federal courts
where Congress had spoken. He strictly construed statutory causes of action,27
and was generally unwilling to infer a private cause of action once Congress
had lodged responsibility for enforcement with a federal agency or had
provided for administrative remedies.28 Despite his early, celebrated dissent
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino29-- in which he urged a narrow role
for the "act of state" doctrine justifying judicial abstention-White was not
uniformly activist on issues of political question, standing, and other prudential
limitations on judicial review.30 Although he often resisted efforts to foreclose
habeas review of constitutional claims denied in state court,3 in recent years
he also joined in severely limiting habeas consideration of defaulted claims and
successive petitions.32
White's clear sense of the primacy of democratic institutions was reflected
in his commitment to the protection of rights to participate in the electoral
27. See, e.g., Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985) (white, J.) ("[Itf Congress'
coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them. We should not
legislate for them."). Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192 n.2 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("I do
not question at this point the power of Congress or a state legislature to ban racial discrimination in private
school admissions decisions. But as I see it Congress has not yet chosen to exercise that power.").
White's close textual interpretation of statutes creating causes of action occasionally led him to assert
wider federal jurisdiction. His concurring opinion in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 646 (1979) (White, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that civil rights legislation of
Reconstruction Congress provided remedy for denial not only of constitutional rights but also of rights
created by federal statutes), was adopted by a majority of the Court in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I
(1980) (White, J., joining majority). Subsequently, the Court restricted the potential reach of Thiboutot. See
Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1, 33 (1981) (White, J., dissenting in part); Middlesex
County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (White, J., joining majority).
28. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
29. 376 U.S. 398,438-72 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). The next year, Congress passed an amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 designed to undo the Sabbatino decision. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
(1964), Pub. L. No. 88-635, 78 Stat. 1013 (1964). In sponsoring the amendment, Senator Hickenlooper
placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD White's full dissent in the case. 110 CONG. REc. 19546, 19548-54
(1964).
30. "Activist" decisions include Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 740 (1993) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992) (White, J.); Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (White, J.); Clarke v. Securities Ind. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388 (1987) (White, J.); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 502-18 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). More "prudential" decisions include City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (White, J.); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (White, J., joining
majority); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (White, J.). See generally Mary C. Hutton, The Unique
Perspective of Justice White: Separation of Powers, Standing and Section 1983 Cases, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
377 (1988).
31. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1992) (5-4 decision) (White, J., joining majority
opinion refusing to extend Stone v. Powell to Miranda violations); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710,
1725-28 (1993) (5-4 decision) (White, J., dissenting from decision easing "harmless error" standard on
habeas review); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from majority's
restrictions on habeas consideration of Fourth Amendment claims).
32. For instance, Justice White joined the majority opinions in McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454
(1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); and Engel v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). See also Herrera
v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 875 (1993) (White, J., concurring in judgment); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
316-17 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 97 (1977) (White, J., concurring in judgment but declining to adopt majority's "cause and prejudice"
standard).
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process. From Avery v. Midland County3 3 to Board of Estimate of the City of
New York v. Morris,'4 he led the Court in expansively interpreting the
principle of "one person, one vote" in order to ensure that varieties of political
apportionment and gerrymandering do not vitiate minority voting rights. His
dissent in City of Mobile v. Bolden35 effectively became the majority position
two Terms later in Rogers v. Lodge,36 which eased the burden of minority
challenges to electoral districting schemes that perpetuate purposeful racial
discrimination, and he wrote a strong dissent from last Term's ruling in Shaw
v. Reno37 which struck down a North Carolina redistricting scheme that had
been drawn to ensure minority representation. 8 As indicated in Buckley and
subsequent cases, White was willing to go further than other Justices in
permitting legislative regulation of the electoral processes to root out potential
corruption and inequality, even at the cost of some inhibition of free speech. 9
More generally, his First Amendment jurisprudence permitted significant
intrusions on the media, whether in the form of the "fairness doctrine," as in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC;4" search warrants, as in Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily;41 subpoenas, as in Branzburg v. Hayes;42 or libel law, as in
Herbert v. Lando43 and his dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.44 White
advocated lesser First Amendment protections for commercial speechn5 and
33. 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (White, J.).
34. 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (White, J.).
35. 446 U.S. 55, 94 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
36. 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (White, J.).
37. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2834 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
38. See also Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986) (White, J.) (holding that gerrymanders that
allow group to be "denied its chance to effectively influence the political process" are unconstitutional);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (White, J.) (striking down multi-member election districts in
Texas); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (White, J.) (striking down property-tax-payers
only election scheme). White was not concerned with minor variations in population among districts, see,
e.g., Regester, 412 U.S. at 764; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); or relatively unburdensome
franchise restrictions, see, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (White, J.); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974) (White, J.); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 61 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
39. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting
majority's conclusion that certain limitations on political contributions violated free speech guarantees); see
also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 507-08 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("Congressional regulation of the amassing and spending of money in political campaigns
without doubt involves First Amendment concerns, but [the restrictions here] . . . are supported by
governmental interests-including, but not limited to, the need to avoid real or apparent
corruption-sufficiently compelling to withstand scrutiny"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold state prohibitions on corporate campaign
contributions).
40. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (White, J.).
41. 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (White, J.).
42. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (White, J.).
43. 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (White, J.).
44. 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (White, J.); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1521 (1993) (White, J., joining dissent);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (White, J.).
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showed deference to the regulation and prosecution of obscenity,46 child
pornography,47 and subversive advocacy.48 He was a leading opponent of a
strict, separatist conception of the establishment of religion, and allowed, for
instance, state aid for nonsectarian activities in parochial schools. 9
Although White gave broad scope to legislative power, he usually
subjected the legislative product to close scrutiny for invidious purpose or for
insufficient relationship to a legitimate purpose. 0 Thus he dissented in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguezj' on the ground that disparities in school
district funding did not serve a rational purpose. Similarly, over a decade later
his opinion for the Court in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center-2 employed
the usually lax rational basis test to strike down a zoning ordinance forbidding
a group home for retarded persons in a residential neighborhood, while his
dissenting opinion in Lyng v. Castillo53 nominally applied a rational basis test
in urging that a "natural family" eligibility restriction in food stamp regulations
was unconstitutional. In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,54 White
argued in dissent that the blanket exclusion of methadone users from transit
jobs violated both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment.
For a period of time, White's purpose analysis produced a more activist
equal protection jurisprudence than a majority of the Court was willing to
embrace; for example, his 1971 dissent in Palmer v. Thompson55 urged that
a Mississippi town should not be permitted to close its swimming pool where
its purpose was to prevent implementation of a desegregation order.
5 6
46. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977) (White, J.); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291
(1977) (White, J., joining majority); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)
(White, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (White, J.). White would not, however, permit
censorship of non-obscene expression. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (1991) (White,
J., dissenting); Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of writ of
certiorari); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (White, J.).
47. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (White, J.); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (White, J.).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 282-89 (1967) (White, J., dissenting); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 620-29 (1967) (White, J., joining dissent); DeGregory v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966) (White, J., joining dissent).
49. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (White, J.) (upholding statute requiring school
districts to loan textbooks to students in parochial as well as public and non-sectarian schools); see also
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (White, J., joining majority); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (White, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (White, J., joining dissent); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting in both Grand Rapids and in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985));
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (White, J., joining majority); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282
(1981) (White, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,661 (1971) (White, J., dissenting in part).
50. See generally William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 347 (1987).
51. 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
52. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (White, J.).
53. 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
54. 440 U.S. 568, 597 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
55. 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
56. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (White, J.) (striking down amendment to city
charter requiring electoral approval of open-housing ordinance); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
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Similarly, in school desegregation cases, White was as ready as any member
of the Court to find evidence of past purposeful discrimination and to approve
broad remedies. His majority opinions in Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick57 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman"5 permitted inference
of discriminatory purpose from evidence of discriminatory effect and placed
the burden on the defendant school system to prove that it had not caused any
current racial segregation in its schools. In addition, he held the state, not the
defendant school district, ultimately responsible for removing the effects of
purposeful discrimination; thus he would have permitted neither the
happenstance of school district boundaries nor state laws impeding school
funding to stand in the way of remedial decrees. Although he was in a
minority in Milliken v. Bradley"9 in arguing for a remedy of interdistrict
busing, he wrote the five-four decision in Missouri v. Jenkins60 upholding the
power of the federal district court to order a defendant school board to impose
tax increases in violation of fiscally restrictive state law. In his penultimate
Term on the Court, White wrote for an eight-one majority in rejecting the
claim that there is a lesser duty to desegregate in higher education.6
In the absence of a finding of discriminatory purpose, however, White
believed that disparate impact alone did not warrant liability for violating the
constitutional principle of equal protection of the laws, and so held in 1976 for
seven members of the Court in the seminal case of Washington v. Davis.6
Unlike some members of the Davis majority, White never adopted the view
that the Constitution prohibits all "reverse discrimination" to counteract diffuse
societal discrimination. Thus his joint opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,63 permitted government to take race into account in
university admissions. His votes in Fullilove v. Klutznick64 and Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC,65 to uphold federal minority "set-aside" and race-
preference requirements, underscored his deference to Congress' authority
(White, J.) (striking down amendment to California Constitution protecting private discrimination in real
estate transactions). See generally Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense and the Constitution: Justice White
and the Egalitarian Ideal, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 433 (1987).
57. 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (White, J.)
58. 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (White, J.).
59. 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
60. 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (White, J.).
61. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). Only Justice Scalia declined to join White's
opinion, 112 S. Ct. 2746 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice
Thomas filed a concurrence emphasizing that in his view that opinion did not "foreclose the possibility that
there exists 'sound educational justification' for maintaining historically black colleges as such." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
62. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (White, J.). The two dissenters in Davis, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
urged that the qualifying test for police applicants at issue in that case violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; they explicitly declined to address the constitutional issue. See 426 U.S. at 257 n.l (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
63. 438 U.S. 265, 324 (joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
64. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (White, J., joining majority).
65. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (White, J., joining majority).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment even as he voted in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. to strike down a local government's "set-aside" scheme.66
Although White thus recognized congressional power to permit and even
to encourage race-consciousness and other forms of affirmative action, by the
end of his tenure he found himself at odds with Congress itself over the extent
to which that authority had been exercised in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. In 1971 White had joined the majority opinion in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.67 For more than a decade thereafter he appeared content with
permitting disparate impact alone to be sufficient for broad, race-conscious
remedies in employment discrimination cases brought under Title VI.68 In
1979, he even joined in refusing to upset a private employer's voluntary use
of racial quotas.69 White began to express significant dissatisfaction with
aspects of the prevailing Title VII jurisprudence in a series of opinions, mostly
dissenting, in the mid-1980s. 70 By the end of that decade, amid indications
that the disparate impact test invited reliance on racial quotas, White
commanded a majority in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio7' to shift the
burden of proof in disparate impact cases. Wards Cove, together with several
other decisions that White joined, were legislatively overturned by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.72
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (White, J., joining majority).
67. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (White, J., joining majority).
68. See generally Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 471
(1987). Appearances may have been deceiving. It is instructive to note that Griggs was a unanimous
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, in which the Court mentioned several times that the employer had
previously engaged in overt, intentional race discrimination, 401 U.S. at 426-27, 428, 429, and in which
the Court concluded that the employer's present requirements of a high school diploma and intelligence
tests were "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment ... [that] operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of rac[e]." Id. at 43 1. As early as 1977, Justice White expressed some discomfort
with liability in disparate impact cases that involved less manifest proof of discrimination. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J., dissenting in Dothard and concurring in Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 347 (1977)). See also infra note 74.
69. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (White, J., joining majority). Nearly a decade
later, White wrote that he had voted to uphold the employer's plan in Weber in the belief that it was
designed to remedy past intentional discrimination by the employer and union, not simply racial imbalance
in job categories, and that he would vote to overrule Weber rather than endorse the Court's present
interpretation. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
70. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); Local Number 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 531-35 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Local
28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 499-500 (1986) (White, J., dissenting);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1986) (White, J., concurring in judgment);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (White, J.); see also Johnson, 480 U.S.
at 616 (White, J., dissenting).
71. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (White, J.).
72. Wards Cove was one of three 5-4 civil rights decisions during October Term 1988 that made it
more difficult for employees to make claims against their employers. The other cases were Lorance v.
American Tel. & Tel. Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (White, J., joining majority) (holding that
operation of seniority system having disparate impact on men and women is not unlawful unless
discriminatory intent is proved), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (White, J., joining majority)
(holding that new employees are not precluded from challenging employer decisions taken pursuant to
consent decree). These decisions were the primary impetus behind the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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White's Title VII jurisprudence was a matter of statutory, not
constitutional, interpretation. Yet his wariness about the use of racial quotas
in employment was apparent in constitutional cases as well, most notably
Davis. One may infer several reasons for White's different stances in equal
protection cases involving education (such as Bakke or Columbus and Dayton)
and those involving employment (such as Davis). Even outside the race-
discrimination context, White adopted an ethic of equal opportunity in
education, as illustrated by his dissent in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez,73 where he would have struck down school financing schemes that
leave the poorest school districts with the worst schools. In addition, while
busing does not deny schooling to any child, White expressed particular
unhappiness with quota systems that appear to take jobs away from
nondiscriminating white workers. Finally, White was clearly concerned that
judicial imposition of systems of racial preference in employment would cause
upheavals in collective bargaining, regulatory regimes, and other underpinnings
of post-New Deal industrial society.74
White's belief in the legitimacy of the law in ordering our social life,
along with his confidence in the political institutions of government, made him
reluctant to impose "decriminalization" either directly (by limiting legislative
power to punish), or indirectly (by insisting on perfection from police,
prosecutors, and others charged with achieving criminal justice). Even as he
joined the holding in Furman v. Georgia,75 striking down a capital
punishment scheme that provided no guidance for the sentencing authority,
White noted the good faith of Georgia in granting discretion to sentencing
juries out of a "desire to mitigate the harshness" of capital punishment laws.76
Subsequently, he voted to uphold structured death penalty laws, rejecting the
arguments that juries "disobey or nullify their instructions"7 7 and that others
who retain discretion, such as prosecutors, inevitably wield it arbitrarily.
78
73. 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 49 & 51 and accompanying
text.
74. Justice White wrote that liability based solely on discriminatory impact "would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than
to the more affluent white." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). This statement suggests that
as early as 1976, White was unhappy with disparate impact analysis. As Dean Liebman has noted, this
statement "would have been an appropriate sentence in a dissent from Griggs itself." Liebman, supra note
68, at 477.
75. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1978) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
76. Id. at 313.
77. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment in Jurek and in
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)).
78. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("I decline
to interfere with the manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce [capital punishment] ... laws on what
is simply an assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally
fair manner."). Compare White's statement in his dissent in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,499 (1964):
Obviously law enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today's
decision shows that even judges can do, but I have somewhat more faith than the Court
evidently has in the ability and desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts
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Invoking the Court's ill-famed journey earlier in this century into the realm of
substantive due process, 79 he refused to make the judgment that the penalty
cannot comport with the Constitution."0 White did, however, recognize
substantive limitations on the types of crimes for which the penalty may be
imposed; he wrote Coker v. Georgia,8' holding the death penalty
disproportionate for the rape of an adult, and Enmund v. Florida,82 holding
capital punishment unavailable where a murder conviction was based solely on
a theory of felony murder.
The criteria of "reasonableness" and "good faith," at the core of much of
White's jurisprudence, were especially prominent in his approach to the Fourth
Amendment.8 3 He long urged, persuasively if not entirely successfully, that
the overriding command of the Fourth Amendment is its inclusive
"reasonableness" requirement, not its more limited "warrant" requirement.
84
He wrote the opinion in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,85
which spawned a new jurisprudence permitting an array of regulatory searches
to discern and correct such violations of the law.
79. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down New Deal regulation of
coal industry); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (striking down state limitations on
corporate ownership of pharmacies); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down
minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down state prohibition
of "yellow dog" labor contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down federal
prohibition of "yellow dog" labor contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down
state law setting maximum hours for bakers); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down
state insurance licensing). See generally Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969, at
98-169 (1972).
80. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (decrying majority's
"surrender... to the temptation to make policy for and to attempt to govern the country through a misuse
of the powers given this Court under the Constitution"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in judgment) ("Petitioner has argued, in effect, that no matter how effective the death
penalty may be as a punishment, government, created and run as it must be by humans, is inevitably
incompetent to administer it. This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitutional law."); see also
supra note 8 and accompanying text and infra notes 112, 115.
81. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (White, J.).
82. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) ('White, J.).
83. See Kate Stith, Search and Seizure, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 480
(Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. 1 1992). In addition to the cases cited below, see, e.g., Jacobson v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) (White, J.) (5-4 decision) (holding that government agents had
entrapped defendant in child pornography case); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976)
(upholding federal regulation authorizing warrantless arrests based on probable cause, so as to avoid
"encumber[ing] criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent
circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the
like").
84. The first clause of the Fourth Amendment provides for "[t]he right of the people to be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures," while the second clause provides that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause .... Examining the framing of the Amendment and historical practice, Justice
White argued that the purpose of the warrant clause was to prohibit general warrants, not to require
warrants for all searches and seizures. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (White,
J., dissenting); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 780-81 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). Recent historical
scholarship is in accord. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1994).
85. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (White, J.). The dissenters argued that the Fourth Amendment, or at least its
warrant clause, did not apply at all to civil inspections. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967)
(Clark, J., dissenting as to both Camara and See.)
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based on less than probable cause.86 Yet he also wrote Tennessee v.
Garner,8 7 which limited on Fourth Amendment grounds the use of deadly
force against fleeing felons.88 His oft-stated antipathy to the exclusionary rule
as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations89 finally led to adoption of the
"good faith" exception to that rule in United States v. Leon. 90 White likewise
took a functional and pragmatic approach to the Sixth Amendment's right to
jury trial.9' He resisted efforts to limit criminal investigations and forfeitures
through broad application of the right to counsel;92 he dissented from
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination that departed from historical practice and might impede the
reliable administration of justice;93 and he was at the forefront of the Court
in allowing great leeway in plea bargaining, as in Brady v. United States.
94
White's criminal procedure opinions revealed not only his perspective on
issues of criminal justice but also his unusual commitment to the rule of stare
decisis in constitutional adjudication, which sometimes led to the perception
86. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968) (White, J., joining majority holding that "reasonable
suspicion" is sufficient for street stop, as well as concurring separately, 392 U.S. at 34); United States v.
Brignoni*Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1973) (holding that reasonable suspicion is sufficient for Border Patrol
stops for questioning) (Justice White's concurring opinion appears at United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
914 (1973), concurring in judgments as to both Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 n.26 (1976) (White, J.) (suggesting that states may stop vehicles at inspection checkpoints without
reasonable suspicion as long as stops are random; over a decade later, the Court upheld such a checkpoint
program, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (white, J., joining majority)); New
Jersey v. T. L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984) (White, J.) (permitting limited school searches on reasonable
suspicion); National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (White, J., joining majority)
(upholding Customs Service drug testing program); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (White, J., joining majority) (upholding testing of workers involved in railroad accidents or
safety violations).
87. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (White, J.).
88. Taken together, White's opinions on the Fourth Amendment comprehend a protection of broad
scope yet uncertain depth. Or, "[a]s one critic of his decisions has said, [Justice White] sees the Fourth
Amendment as 'a mile wide and a millimeter deep."' Monroe E. Price, White: A Justice of Studied
Unpredictability, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 18, 1980, at 24.
89. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
90. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (White, J.).
91. On the one hand, White wrote a series of opinions establishing that an impartial and fairly chosen
jury is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)
(White, J.); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (White, J.); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(White, J.); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (White, J.). On the other hand, he dispensed with
the need for unanimity or 12 persons on a jury. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality
opinion) (White, J.); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (White, J.).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (White, J.); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). Compare Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)
(White, J., joining majority) (holding Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause applicable to civil
forfeiture).
93. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 328 (1969) (White, J., dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965) (White,
J., joining dissent); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
94. 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (White, J.); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)
(White, J., joining majority); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (White, J.).
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that he was "unpredictable." 95 Like many Justices, White was ready to
overrule previous decisions that proved unworkable or ill-advised. For instance,
he joined Batson v. Kentucky,9 6 which, overruling his own Swain v.
Alabama,97 subjected preemptory jury challenges to judicial review for racial
discrimination; in his concurring opinion in Batson, White acknowledged that
Swain's confidence in state prosecutors had not been vindicated.98 Yet White,
more than other Justices (regardless of ideological inclination), on most issues
sought to adhere to constitutional precedent not yet overruled. In practical
terms this meant that White sparingly dissented in constitutional cases on the
ground that the controlling precedent was wrongly decided.99
Thus, although he dissented forcefully in Miranda,'0° he clearly accepted
the major contours of that decision. Indeed, he wrote Edwards v. Arizona,'"'
which went beyond the core of Miranda in prohibiting police-initiated
questioning once the suspect in custody has requested an attorney."2
Similarly, despite his long, carefully composed dissent from the holding in
Payton v. New York 03 which required a warrant to arrest someone in his
home, White ten years later wrote the majority opinion applying Payton to the
arrest of someone hiding out overnight in a friend's home."° Even where he
95. See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, The Courtship of Byron White, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 62-63 (quoting
commentators); Marcia Coyle, The High Court's Center Falls Apart, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S1;
Monroe Price, supra note 88, at 24. But see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Byron White: The Consistent
Curmudgeon, CONN. L. TRIB., March 29, 1993, at 24.
96. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (White, J., joining majority).
97. 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (White, J.).
98. 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
99. Two significant lines of cases in which White refused to be bound by precedent he considered
wrongly decided were separation of powers cases, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text, and
abortion rights cases, see infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
100. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). White also dissented
vehemently in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964), which appeared to create a broad, pre-
trial right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. White never advocated overruling Massiah, but
consistently gave it narrow scope, see, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (White, J.); United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 277 (1980) (White, 3., joining dissent).
101. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (White, J.).
102. See also Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (White, J., joining majority) (refusing to
limit habeas consideration of Miranda claims); Arizona v. Fulminante, 11l S. Ct. 1246, 1253-57 (1991)
(White, J., dissenting from majority's holding that admission of involuntary confession is subject to
harmless error analysis); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (White, J., joining majority opinion
applying Edwards); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (White, J., joining majority opinion applying
Edwards). See generally Stuart Taylor, Jr., When Judicial Flips Aren't Flops, Am. LAW., Dec. 17, 1990,
at 23.
103. 445 U.S. 573, 603-20 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
104. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (White, J.); see also James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307
(1990) (5-4 decision) (White, J., joining majority applying exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (expressing disagreement with but accepting validity of broad
exclusionary rule). Justice White's opinion in James, where he provided the fifth vote refusing to
undermine the exclusionary rule by permitting illegally seized evidence to impeach a defense witness,
surprised some observers. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court, 5-4, Reaffirms Curbs on Trial's Use of
Illegal Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al; David 0. Stewart, White to the Right?, A.B.A. J., July
1990, at 40, 42.
White's adamant adherence to stare decisis was revealed outside of criminal law opinions as well.
In his final Term, White wrote the majority opinion holding that New York law violated the First
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was clearly prepared to vote to overrule a precedent, White sometimes
exasperated even sympathetic observers by refusing to cast the fifth vote for
simply narrowing the reach of the precedent, insisting he was bound until a
majority of the Court expressly overruled the controlling case.'0 5
The most controversial decision by White upholding government power to
invoke the criminal process was Bowers v. Hardwick,0 6 which refused to
strike down a Georgia law forbidding sodomy. 0 7 White conceived the issue
much as he had in the death penalty and abortion cases: whether the Supreme
Court should bypass political institutions to establish a new social order. White
had long objected to the Court's enunciation of new constitutional rights
deriving from the concept of "privacy." His concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut' declined to find a general privacy right, emphasizing instead
the lack of a rational relationship between the statute's ban on distributing
contraceptive information to married persons and the asserted purpose of the
statute. Roe v. Wade,'09 the case recognizing a broad right to abortion,
evoked a response reminiscent of his Miranda dissent: "The Court simply
fashions and announces a new constitutional right... with scarcely any reason
or authority."" 0 In dissents in subsequent privacy rights cases during the
1970's and early 1980's, including Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"' which
struck down a zoning ordinance that narrowly defined "single family," White
Amendment by denying after-hours use of school property for religious purposes, while allowing such use
for a wide variety of social, civic, and educational purposes. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). White insisted on citing, and distinguishing, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), even though he had disagreed strongly with the reasoning in Lemon, id. at 661-71 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part), and had repeatedly criticized it. Justice Scalia responded
that "the Court's invocation of the Lemon test" was "[I]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried," and pointedly
noted that White himself had "personally driven pencils through the creature's heart." 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50
(Scalia, J., concurring). White replied in a footnote that "there is a proper way to inter an established
decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled." Id. at 2148 n.7
(White, J.).
105. For instance, although Justice White vehemently dissented from the prohibition on "victim impact
statements" in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), he refused to join four
dissenters who sought to narrow Booth significantly two years later. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, 812 (1989) (White, J., concurring) ("Unless Booth ... is to be overruled, the judgment below must
be affirmed."). Justice White joined the majority in explicitly overruling Booth in Payne v. Tennessee, 111
S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
Similarly, although Justice White issued a strong dissent in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
685-89 (1962), see supra note 8, he refused to join the plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968), that effectively abandoned Robinson's radical narrowing of the role of the criminal law; he instead
wrote a concurring opinion that accepted the doctrinal framework of Robinson. Id. at 548 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment). Despite the absence of a clear majority in Powell, that case is regarded as having
all but overruled Robinson.
106. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J.).
107. The Georgia statute at issue outlawed all sodomy, including that between men and women. The
Court only addressed the challenge to the statute as applied to "consensual homosexual sodomy." 478 U.S.
at 188 n.2.
108. 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting in both Doe and Roe).
111. 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
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even more explicitly compared the Court's "new" substantive due process to
the efforts of the Lochner Court to impose its will upon a divided polity."2
For thirteen years after Roe, White purported to be bound by the holding
of that case. He dissented in abortion rights cases applying Roe, but always
from within the framework of Roe-contending that the challenged restriction
on abortion should be upheld even accepting Roe." 3 Finally, however, in
1986, in his dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 4 White advocated overruling Roe," 5 urging that the right
it recognized was neither "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" nor
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 1 6 For White, Bowers
was a replay of Thornburgh, with the important difference that he was writing
the majority opinion. As White must have anticipated, once a majority of the
Court had adopted his approach to the enunciation of a fundamental right, it
was only a matter of time before Roe itself would begin to collapse, as indeed
it did in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services."7
Yet White himself had recognized certain fundamental liberty interests that
may be subsumed under the label substantive due process-including, in
Griswold, "the right ... to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the
marriage relationship"" 8 and, in a long series of cases (continuing even after
Bowers) dealing with illegitimacy, the "protected liberty interest" that parents
have in a relationship with their children." 9 And even if White was not
112. Id. at 544 ("[Tlhe Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content
into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its
welfare.").
113. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (White, J.,
joining dissent); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting in part).
114. 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
115.
In my view, the time has come to recognize that Roe v. Wade, no less than the cases overruled
by the Court in the [New Deal] decisions I have just cited, 'departs from a proper
understanding' of the Constitution and to overrule it. I do not claim that the arguments in
support of this proposition are new ones .... But if an argument that a constitutional decision
is erroneous must be novel in order to justify overruling that precedent, the Court's decisions
in Lochner v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson would remain the law ....
Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 790-94. White made clear that he did not necessarily approve of either of these tests for
recognizing fundamental rights, but realized that a majority of the Court had adopted them. White also
argued that even accepting Roe and its progeny, the abortion restrictions at issue should have been upheld.
Id. at 797-814.
117. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Justice White joined the plurality opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 513. The collapse of Roe v. Wade was halted, it appears, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In Casey, Justice White again joined the opinion of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, this time an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, id.
at 2855; he also joined Justice Scalia's even more emphatic and provocative opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, id. at 2873.
118. 381 U.S. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
119. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); see also Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361
(1979) (White, J., dissenting); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (White, J.).
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prepared to consider homosexual rights as an aspect of substantive due process,
he might still have recognized discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
as invidiously motivated, and thus unconstitutional pursuant to his purpose-
based approach to equal protection.120 White, however, declined to address
homosexual rights (or abortion rights) within the framework of equal
protection law. Here as elsewhere, Justice White's jurisprudence seldom put
the Court ahead of the country. For him, the Court's primary role in
constitutional lawmaking is not to pioneer or even to lead but, rather, to secure
for the whole Nation the democratic consensus that has already been reached.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
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